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A Safer Sky 
FORUM 
A SAFER SKY: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING FLIGHT SAFETY IN TAIWAN 
Ping I Lee 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 26,1994, China Airlines (CAL) Flight 140, service from Taipei, Taiwan to Nagoya, Japan, crashed near 
Nagoya International Airport while attempting an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 34. The fully 
loaded Airbus 300-622R stalled at an altitude of approximately 1,500 feet which resulted in a fiery crash that killed 
all 264 onboard (Sogame, Ladkin). This tragedy was not the first fatal crash to the Taiwanese carrier. In fact, CAL 
has suffered numerous fatal crashes since its establishment, and it has been rated as one of the most dangerous airlines 
in the world (Schultz). Many argued that the carrier's infamous safety record was a direct result of the culture barriers 
experienced by its flight crews. 
Most people agree that Chinese culture is dramatically different from most other cultures. Many researchers also 
believe that these cultural differences are the fundamental cause of the poor safety records in most Asian nations. The 
purpose of this research paper is to examine the characteristics of Chinese culture and its relationship with aviation 
human factors (AHF). This paper will also examine the possibility of adapting the concept of Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) to improve flight safety. 
HISTORY OF CHINA AIRLINES 
CAL was founded by 26 ex-Taiwanese Air Force Pilots 
in 1959. Although registered as a civilian commercial 
carrier, CAL was, in feet, a covert joint project between the 
Taiwanese Government and the United States' Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The flight crews for CAL were 
all military aviators, and the carrier's primary mission was 
to conduct high-risk covert flights into Southeast Asia (Liu 
1993). 
After the conclusion of the Vietnam War, CAL became 
Taiwan's flag carrier. However, the airline is still operated 
by the government and dominated by Taiwanese Air Force 
personnel. Unlike most privately owned airlines, CAL does 
not emphasize flight safety and CRM. As a result, the 
carrier has experienced numerous safety problems. The 
troubled carrier has suffered six major accidents involving 
699 fatalities within the past decade (Sogame, Ladkin). 
Many AHF researchers have argued that the primary reason 
for CAL's poor safety record is a direct result of culture 
conflicts (Jing, Lu, and Peng). 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINES CULTURE 
It is critical for one to understand certain characteristics 
of Chinese culture before examining its effects on flight 
safety. This section of the paper will attempt to briefly 
introduce several characteristics of the Chinese culture. 
Individualism 
One of the most fundamental differences between 
non-Chinese and Chinese cultures is the idea of 
individualism. Most nations encourage the development of 
individualism, and one is rewarded for expressing his/her 
own opinion. However, individualism is strongly 
discouraged in the Chinese society. This practice is 
strongly rooted within the culture. Chinese children are 
taught at a young age to listen and not speak, and speak 
when only spoken to. This practice is evident in a 
popular Chinese saying "God provided us with two ears 
and only one mouth because we should listen more and 
speak less." This belief resulted in the development of 
collective thinking. Chinese will seldom express his/her own 
opinion during social settings such as conferences, 
lectures, and even intra-cockpit communications. 
Social Pressure 
Unlike non-Chinese culture, Chinese culture is a shame 
culture. Chinese grow up sensitive to pressure from the 
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society instead of their internal feelings. Many cultures 
emphasize honor systems or codes of honor. These 
measurements are often solely based on one's internal 
feelings of guilt, and rely heavily on one's own judgments. 
Such a system could not be implemented in Chinese 
culture, since most Chinese believe in social pressure, and 
it is often society that determines one's belief system. As a 
result, it is a common practice for Chinese to cut corners, 
since it is widely accepted practice by the society. In fact, 
those who cut corners are often rewarded for increased 
efficiency. 
This cultural characteristic can have serious results. 
According to a study conducted by the Taiwanese Naval 
Academy, people in Chinese society could easily break 
rules, operating procedures, and even the code of law when 
it is acceptable to society. Due to the same social pressure, 
Chinese would view such behaviors as righteous and even 
encourage it (Lu, Chang, Wang, Yang, Hao,Li, et al). 
Authoritarianism 
Chinese culture is based on 5000 years of dictatorships. 
As a result, authoritarianism has an important role in the 
society (Jing et al). Figures of authority, such as professors, 
managers, and airline captains are treated with a great 
amount of respect from their subordinates. Unlike cultures 
where this relationship only exists in the working 
environment, Chinese subordinates treat their superiors 
with respect regardless of environments and conditions. 
This relationship between superior and subordinate may be 
seen during daily interactions. In Chinese society, eye 
contact with a figure of authority is considered 
disrespectful, and as thus, is strongly discouraged. 
It is also a common belief that a figure of authority is 
error free. Thus, it is considered an outrage when a Chinese 
subordinate challenges a figure of authority. A figure of 
authority will not allow such a challenge, nor would they 
admit their errors. This is because of the fear of losing face. 
The term "face" in Chinese signifies one's dignity and 
prestige (Crossing the culture). It is often the subordinate's 
responsibility to mainftiin the superior's face, and thus 
maintain the harmony of the group. 
CHINESE CULTURE IN THE COCKPIT 
It is clear that there are significant cultural differences 
between Chinese and Western societies. Certain 
characteristics within the Chinese culture could prove to be 
potentially hazardous in the field of aviation. The following 
pan of this paper will examine the Chinese cultural 
influences in the cockpit. 
As a result of the Nagoya tragedy, the official Japanese 
investigation report recommended C AL ensure that Cockpit 
Resource Management is performed most effectively when 
the CAP (captain) has the F/O (first officer) performing the 
PF (pilot flying) tasks (Sogame, Ladkin). However, 
according to the previous analysis of Chinese culture, one 
can easily realize the challenges in compliance with these 
recommendations. 
Chinese culture is not only deeply rooted in the society, 
but it also influences Chinese cockpit crews. Captains are 
often viewed by Chinese as figures of authority, thus, 
Chinese captains are seldom challenged by their first 
officers during flight operations even if they have 
committed serious safety violations. One of the best 
examples of this practice is an accident which occurred on 
November 4,1993 when a CAL 747-400 landed long into 
Hong Kong's Victoria Bay after its final approach to Hong 
Kong's Tai Kai International Airport. According to the 
post accident interview, the first officer was well aware of 
the fact that his captain (pilot flying) was approaching the 
runway with excess airspeed, and the aircraft would not be 
able to stop on the runway. However, in an attempt to save 
the captain's face and fearing to challenge the figure of 
authority, the first officer did not caution the captain 
regarding the imminent danger. This ultimately resulted in 
the accident (Crossing the culture). The influence of 
authoritarianism was further noted when CAL dismissed 
the first officer while the carrier filed only a punitive letter 
against the captain. 
The effects of social pressure are also noticeable 
between CAL's cockpit crews. It is a common practice for 
certain CAL captains to conduct flight operations with a set 
of written procedures. These so called "cheat sheets" are 
sets of procedures, mostly radio communications dialogs 
with air traffic controllers. These cheat sheets provide 
captains precise dialog during each specific portion of 
flights, (e.g. if the cheat sheet instructs the captain to report 
airport in sight 10 miles from the destination airport. The 
captain would make such report regardless of weather 
conditions.) It is obvious that most of these procedures are 
not approved or allowed by CAL's operation manual. 
However, since such practice is widely used by most 
captains within the carrier, it is socially acceptable by 
others. Due to such social pressure, although prohibited, 
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OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Chinese CRM Programs 
It is clear that Chinese culture could potentially create 
breakdowns in crew communications and create hazardous 
situations. As part of the aftermath of the Nagoya accident, 
CAL has devoted tremendous efforts to introduce and 
educate its pilots with modern CRM concepts. The carrier 
introduced a new CRM program from Lufthansa, one of 
Europe's safest commercial carriers. All pilots underwent 
courses and Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) using 
the new CRM techniques. Although all flight crews were 
introduced to this new concept, it was no match for the 
deeply embedded culture within the pilots. The carrier 
suffered another fatal accident in 1998 when an Airbus 
300-622R crashed while approaching Taipei International 
Airport. The airliner stalled at an altitude of 1200 feet, and 
all 182 onboard and 20 people on the ground were killed. 
It was later determined that some of the contributing causes 
of this tragedy included a breakdown in crew 
communication, and the crews' deviation from standard 
operation procedures. This tragedy proved that there were 
obvious difficulties for Chinese crewmembers in adopting 
and applying Western CRM concepts. 
The concept of CRM has been viewed by many as the 
solution for increasing flight safety since its introduction in 
the 1970s. Fourth generation CRM programs emphasize 
concepts such as automation, fatigue, and cabin/cockpit 
crew coordination (Maurino). According to Maurino, it is 
a common belief by many airline managers that CRM is a 
"culturally free" concept. Many believed that a well 
developed CRM program could be easily transferred 
between different cultures. This belief is shared by many 
airline managers within Asian nations, thus, many Asian 
carriers, such as China Airlines, still educate their pilots by 
utilizing Western CRM programs. Although exposed to 
these advanced CRM concepts, many Asian pilots have 
difficulty in adopting and applying these approaches in an 
Asian cockpit, thus most of these CRM programs have very 
limited success within Asian carriers. It is clear that 
currently, only a culturally sensitive CRM program could 
be effective in increasing crew communication and 
improving flight safety. 
Many AHF experts believe that the introduction of a 
new generation of CRM could successfully resolve the 
cultural conflicts faced by today's programs. According to 
Helmreich and Wilhelm (2002), the fifth generation CRM 
concept could serve as a universal approach to enhance 
flight safety and crew coordination. The primary 
characteristic of this new approach is its focus on human 
error management instead of human error avoidance. Since 
the concepts of human error are universal, this approach 
could be adopted in different cultures. It is clear that the 
development of human error avoidance is culture specific 
since each culture has a unique approach towards human 
error and conflict resolution. However, since the new CRM 
concepts emphasize management of human errors, it is less 
culturally sensitive and therefore may be applied 
universally to different cultures. 
This writer believes that it is critical for CAL to develop 
its own culturally sensitive CRM program utilizing 
concepts from both fourth and fifth generation CRM 
programs. It is clear that only a program developed for the 
Chinese culture would be most effective and acceptable for 
flight crews in CAL. Such a program should be developed 
by conducting combinations of line audits and crew 
interviews. It is critical to utilize a third party to work with 
CAL's AHF experts to design and conduct this program. 
Crew resistance could be expected during the initial stages 
of the development process. However, this writer believes 
the long term benefit of such a CRM program could easily 
outweigh the temporary inconveniences. 
Incident Reporting System 
In Taiwan, accidents are often one of the few sources for 
improvement in flight safety. Although accident 
investigation is a critical aspect of flight safety, preventing 
accidents from occurring should be the primary objective of 
flight safety. Aviation accidents are often the result of a 
series of operational errors. Thus, flight safely can be 
dramatically enhanced if the trend of operating errors could 
be identified and corrected prior to the circumstances which 
result in an accident. Incident investigations often provide 
safety experts with the trend of operating errors prior to the 
occurrence of an accident. According to Baker, incident 
investigations often create better accident prevention results 
than accident investigations. 
One of the greatest challenges faced by Taiwanese 
aviation authorities and air carriers is the lack of 
appropriate systems for flight crews to report operation 
deviations and pilot errors. Although the Taiwanese 
aircrew confidential reporting program has been in effect 
since 1999, it has suffered from limited funding and low 
participation. It is common for a Chinese figure of 
authority, such as a captain, to deny any errors or wrong 
doing, thus, it is crucial to educate all line pilots the correct 
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mental models of human errors. Using concepts from the 
fifth generation CRM, crews must realize that occurrences 
of human error are often part of the flight operation. Thus, 
one should learn to manage and report such errors instead 
of concealing them. The Taiwanese incident self-reporting 
program would only be successful with cooperation from its 
participating flight crews. Pilot Training Process 
The other contributing factor to CAL's poor safety 
record is its pilot selection and training process. Unlike 
most nations, general aviation does not exist in Taiwan, 
thus airlines can only select its pilots from the military or 
conduct its own ab initio training programs. As a result, 
military aviators have long been the primary candidates for 
CAL's pilot selection programs. These aviators are 
experienced, well trained, and easily adapt to operating an 
airliner. It is also clear to CAL's managers that utilizing 
these air force pilots will reduce training costs dramatically. 
Thus, the majority of CAL pilots are retired military 
aviators. 
Although military pilots require minimum training, 
many of these candidates also lack the mental model of an 
air transport pilot. Due to the constant threats from 
communist China, Taiwanese armed forces emphasize the 
development of tactical skills and the ability to accomplish 
combat missions. Thus the Taiwanese military trains its 
pilots to accomplish their missions at all costs. As a result, 
flight safety has often been disregarded in the military 
community. One of the examples of such practice is the 
go-around syndrome. It is common for the military aviators 
to reject go-around during a bad approach. Since they 
perceive a go-around signifies the lack of skills and failure, 
most Taiwanese aviators would attempt to conduct landings 
under hazardous conditions. If a successful landing were 
accomplished under hazardous conditions, it often viewed 
by others as a demonstration of excellent airmanship. There 
are few doubts that this practice is an unsafe act, ignoring 
all safety regulations, however, since safety is not the 
primary concern of the military, such acts are socially 
accepted and pilots are even encouraged to perform these 
hazardous operations. Sadly, many military pilots maintain 
the same attitude while serving the traveling public. In fact, 
the 1998 Taipei's tragedy was partly caused by the crews' 
refusal of go-around on an unstable approach. 
This writer believes the solution for this problem lies in the 
selection methods for Taiwanese pilots. It is clear that the 
military established its training methods and criterion from 
necessity. However, without an appropriate transition 
training, these military aviators are potential hazards 
within the civilian aviation industry. Civilian carriers 
should establish clear standards and aptitude tests during 
pilot selection process, and reduce its reliance on military 
pilots. This writer believes that the most effective solution 
to such problem is to establish airline flight training 
academies. There are few doubts that tactical flying is very 
different compared to passenger transports. The military 
often bases its selection of pilots upon one's aggressiveness 
and ability to work under highly stressful combat situations. It 
is obvious that civilian air carriers do not require all the 
characteristics of a military pilot. Air carriers could easily 
select appropriate applicants for air carrier operations with 
an established flight training institution. Carriers could also 
introduce concepts such as CRM and proper flight 
procedures during initial stages of flight training. This 
writer believes that a rigorous selection process, and proper 
comprehensive flight training could dramatically improved 
flight safety for Taiwanese airlines. CONCLUSION 
Overall, it is clear that the Chinese culture plays a 
significant role in CRM and flight safety. However, these 
cultural characteristics have often been overlooked by most 
Taiwanese authorities. As a result, the majority of 
Taiwanese flight crews are experiencing difficulties in 
utilizing modern CRM concepts within a Chinese culture 
oriented cockpit. These deficiencies often result in 
deviations from operating procedures, breakdowns in crew 
communication, and fatal accidents. This paper has 
identified several unique characteristics within the Chinese 
culture and their effects in today's multi-crew cockpit. 
There are few doubts that certain cultural practices could 
become potential hazards in flight operations. However, 
this writer believes that the key to resolving these concerns 
is to develop proper training procedures adopting these 
cultural traits. Only a proper training program designed to 
incorporate the unique cultural traits can be successful and 
accepted by Chinese crewmembers.* 
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